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[L. A. No. 23061.

In Bank.

et al., Petitioners, v.
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and
AUGUSTUS

R. E. SPRIGGS, INC.

[1] Workmen's

Employer's Lien
pose of 1949 amendments of Lab.
correct statutory inequity which
ment for attorney's fees
in prosecution of injured
employee's independent action against third person, although
full amount of
in favor of
under converse
circumstances, might be allowed as a credit against compensation.
[2] !d.-Actions Against Third
Lien Against
Judgment-Attorney's Pees.-:N o provrswn is made in Lab.
Code, §§ 3856, 3861, for reimbursement to either employer or
injured employee for his legal expense when a third party's
liability has been settled by either of them; a judicial proceeding is contemplated before any deduction may be allowed for
such expense.
[3] !d.-Actions Against Third Persons--Amount of Settlement
Subject to Employer's Claim.-Lah. Code, § 3860, relating to
settlements of rights of action
third persons before
judgment or without suit, is
by 1949 amendments
of Lab. Code,
3856, 3861; such amendments show no legislative intent to alter reimbursement
relating to
settlement, and entire amount of such settlement continues to
be subject to employer's elaim for reimbursement for his compensation expenditures and liability.
[4] Id.- Actions Against Third Persons- Notice of Suit: Attorney's Pees.-There is a clear distinction between a suit to
enforce injured employee's cause of action against a third
person, and a settlement which is made by employee; if employee commences action he must give to other party written
notice of action (Lab. Code, ~ 3853) and the parties may make
arrangements for payment of attorney's fees, or if they do not
do so a reasonable attorney's fee for each may be fixed by
court (Lab. Qode, ~ 3856), but the Legislature has made no
provision for either notice to the other party when a settlement is contemplated or for determination of amount of an
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 17; Am.Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation, § 366.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Workmen's Compensation, § 35 1
[4] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 26, 33.
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attorney's fee when it is effected, and to extend provisions for
recoupment of attorney's fees beyond their application to a
judicial action would be to do so without the safeg·uards
applicable to them.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission allowing a credit against an award of compensation for personal injuries. Award affirmed in part and
annulled in part with directions.
Kearney, Scott & Clopton for Petitioners.
Everett A. Corten and Gordon W. Winbigler for Hespondents.
EDMONDS, J.-The Industrial Accident Commission credited against an award of compensation only $1,400 of the
amount received by Augustus Chiarello in settlement of his
elaim against an asserted third party tort feasor. His employer and its insurance carrier contend that they are entitled
to the entire amount obtained by the settlement without
deduction of attorney's fees.
Chiarello was employed by R E. Spriggs, Inc. He claimed
to have sustained injuries while he was delivering merchandise to the Panorama Market. \Vithout filing suit or notifying either his employer or its insurer, he made a settlement
with Panorama for $2,100 and executed a full release of all
claims against it.
In the proceeding before the commission, after allowing
a credit of $2,100, on its own motion the commission reopened
the matter for rt>consideration. By the new decision, the
commission credited againsV the compensation award only
$1,400, "being the amount recovered by the appli(•ant . . .
after payment of attorney's fee of $700.00, which sum is
found to constitute a reasonable attorney's fee for services
rendered in effecting recovery for the benefit of the employer.''
As grounds for annulling the award, the employer asserts
that there is no statutory authority for the commission to
withhold from a credit against an award of compensation the
attorney's fees paid by an employee to effect a settlement.
But even if that contention is incorrect, the argument continues, attorney's fees should be allowed only when fixed
by a court or by an agreement between the employee's attorney and the employer or its insurer. Another contention is
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that in the present case there is no evidentiary support for
a finding either that Chiarello paid out $700 for an attorney's
fee, or that such a fee is a reasonable one for the services
rendered.
It is agreed by all of the parties that the decisive question
in this proceeding is the effect of certain amendments to the
Labor Code, made in 1949. (Stats. 1949, ch. 120, pp. 355-356.)
Prior to the amendments, the provisions of that code were
construed in Dodds v. Stellar, 30 Cal.2d 496 (183 P.2d 658].
It was concluded that three remedies are available to an
employer to recover, from a negligent third party, the expenses of compensation to which an injured employee is
entitled. The employer may bring an independent suit
against the third party (Lab. Code, § 3852) or he may consolidate his action with, or join with the employee in, an action
against the third party (Lab. Code, § 3853). If he has
pursued neither of these remedies, he may claim in the employee's action a first lien in the amount of his expenditures
for compensation ''against the entire amount of any judgment
for damages recovered by the employee." (Lab. Code,
§ 3856.)
In the Dodds case, the employee sued the third party and
joined the employer and its insurer as defendants. The
employer sought as a lien against the judgment in that action
an amount equal to its costs of compensating the employee.
Upon appeal, the employee contended that the trial court
should have deducted from the amount payable by the judgment to the employer in satisfaction of its lien, the attorney's
fees paid by the injured workman in prosecuting the action.
This contention was rejected. It was pointed out that the
statutory provisions relating to an employer's right of reimbursement define the rights of the parties and completely
cover the field.
Although, under the statutes then in effect, provision was
made for reimbursing an employer for its attorney's fees
expended when prosecuting an action alone (Lab. Code,
§ 3854), there was no similar provision for compensating an
employee when he sued in an action which benefited the
employer. Both in cases where recovery was obtained as
the result of a suit against the tort feasor (Lab. Code, § 3856)
and where a settlement was effected (Lab. Code, § 3860) the
"entire amount" of such judgment or settlement was subject
to the employer's full claim for reimbursement for his com-

788
Similar provisions were
stated in section
which deals with a proceeding before
the commission instituted after a
or settlement has
been obtained.
to sections 3854,
The 1949 amendments eonsist of
3856,
and the addition of section 3863. Only those
amendments
and 3861 are pertinent
to the
with the
amended
reads:
Section 3861 : '' 'fhe commission is
to and shall
allow, as a credit to the employer to be applied against his
liability for compensation, such amount of any recovery by
the employee for his
either
settlement or after
judgment, as has not theretofore been applied to reimburse
the employer, or has not been applied to the payment of an
attorney's fee to the employee's attorney, pursuant to the
provisions of section 3856 of this code."
Section 3856 : ''The court shall first
out of the
entire amount of any judgment for any damage recovered
by the employee, a sufficient amount to reimburse the employer for the amount of his expenditures for compensation.
If the employer has not joined in the action or has not brought
action, or if his action has not been consolidated, the court,
on his application shall allow, as a first lien against the entire
amount of any judgment for any damages recovered by the
employee, the amount of the employer's expenditures for
compensationj provided, however, that where the employer
has failed to join. 1:n said action and to be represented therein
by his own attorney, or where the employer has not made
arrangernents with the employee's attorney to represent him
in said action, the court shall fix a reasonable attorney's fee,
which shall be fixed as a share of the amwunt actually received
by the employe-r, to be paid to the employee's attorney on
account of the services rende1·ed by him in effecting recovery
for the benefit of the employer, which said fee shall be deducted from any amounts due to the employer."
•-A clause was added to section 3854 to specify that the attorney's fees
allowed an employer who prosecutes an independent action shall be based
"solely upon the services rendered by the employe1·'s attorney in effecting recovery for the benefit of the employee.''
Section 3863 provides: "No provision of this chapter shall be deemed
to impair the right of the employee and his attorney to contract as
between themselves for attorney's fees to be paid by the employee for
prosecuting any action or claim against any person other than the
employer."
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[1] .As the employer points out, the purpose of these
amendments was to correct the statutory inequity which allowed an employer reimbursement for attorney's fees expended in the prosecution of an independent action although
the full amount of a judgment in favor of an employee, under
converse circumstances,
be allowed as a credit against
liability has
compensation. [2] But when the
the
there
been settled, either
is no provision for reimbursement to either of them for his
legal expenses. A deduction for that expense is allowed by
section 3861 only ''pursuant to the provisions of section 3856
to a situation in
of this code.'' Section 3856 applies
which a lien is sought against a
where the employer ''has failed to join in said action'' or has not arranged
with the employee's attorney "to represent him in said action," in which case "the court shall fix a reasonable attorney's fee." It is clear from these provisions that a judicial
proceeding is contemplated.
[3] On the other hand, section 3860, which deals with
settlements before judgment or without suit, is unaffected by
the statutory change. It continues to provide that "[t]he
entire amount of such settlement, or of any settlement without
suit, is subject to the employer's full claim for reimbursement
and liability.''
for his compensation
The commission construes the amendments discussed as repealing section 3860 by implication, and in its order accompanying its decision upon
states that a lack of an
express provision for that purpose "would appear to be due
to a failure to correlate and to amend all the applicable sections.'' The amendments show no legislative intention to
alter the reimbursement provisions relating to settlements,.
and there is nothing in them to warrant a conclusion that a
failure to amend the applicable sections was. due to a legislative oversight.
Several policy arguments have been advanced. The
commission insists that a construction of the amendments
denying to it the power to fix a reasonable attorney's fee
for effecting a settlement and to deduct that amount from
the employer's credit against an award will tend to discourage
settlements, a result which the law disfavors. The petitioners
assert that such a construction will compel the employer and
employee to work harmoniously in prosecuting the claim,
whereas a contrary reading of the statute would invite the
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employee to effect an independent settlement contrary to the
best interests of the employer.
[ 4] There is a clear distinction between a suit to enforce
the employee's cause of action against a third party, and a
settlement which is made by the employee. The employee
or employer vvho commences an action ''shall forthwith give
to the other written notice of the action, and of the name
of the court in which the action is brought . . . . " (Lab.
Code, § 3853.) In that manner, each of them is afforded an
opportunity to exert some control over the prosecution of
the action if he believes it to be desirable. The parties may
make arrangements for the payment of attorney's fees;
if they do not do so, or if they refuse to cooperate in bringing
the action, a reasonable attorney's fee for each may be fixed
by the court. (Lab. Code, § 3856.)
But the Legislature has not made provision for either
notice to the other party when a settlement is contemplated
or for the determination of the amount of an attorney's fee
when it is effected. The employee's purpose is to recover an
amount in addition to his compensation award; the employer
is interested primarily in the recovery below that amount.
\Vhen the chances of recovery are most favorable, the amount
of the settlement obtained generally will be larger and the
expense of an attorney's fee less. Ordinarily the employee
will have greater incentive to press for a favorable recovery.
But when the claim is doubtful, the converse situation is
presented. And there may be little incentive for the employee to press a claim whose proceeds would inure only to
the benefit of the employer.
In short, to extend the provisions for recoupment of
.attorney's fees beyond their application to a judicial action
would be to do so without the safeguards applicable to them.
The clear and literal construction of the new amendments
does not support such an extension, and, as stated in Dodds
v. Stellar, supra, "[i] f there is to be any change in these
statutory provisions defining the rights of the parties, the
suggestion for such change should be addressed to the Legislature rather than to the courts." (30 Cal.2d at 506.)
Other contentions are based upon the assumption that a
deduction for attorney's fees may be allowed from a settlement and require no discussion.
That portion of the award which gives to California Compensation Insurance Company a credit of only $1,400 is an-
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nulled with directions to the commission to allow a credit of
$2,100; in all other respects the award is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and Bray,
J. protem.,* concurred.

CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority holding here is subject to all the objections
pointed out in my dissent in Dodds v. Stellar, 30 Cal.2d 496
[183 P.2d 658]. (See discussion 21 So.Cal.L.Rev. 298.)
After the decision of this court in the Dodds case the J)egislature amended the Workmen's Compensation Act for the
obvious purpose of rectifying the manifest inequities permitted by the Dodds case. Yet the majority here holds that
the amendments do not embrace a case where, as here, a
settlement of the claim against the tort feasor has been
consummated without suit, because the Legislature did not
amend section 3860 of the Labor Code which provides that
a settlement with or without suit is subject to the employer's
claim for the compensation paid by him. Manifestly that can
refer only to such portion of the settlement as remains after
the attorney's fee, for obtaining the settlement, has been paid.
It is obvious that the provision authorizing the payment of
attorney's fees is clearly applicable to a settlement consummated by the employee. (Lab. Code, § 3861, as amended
Stats. 1949, ch. 120.) 'l'hat section authorizes the crediting
to the employee of his attorney's fees whether the recovery is
by settlement or judgment. It refers to the application of
the settlement to the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to
section 3856, and the latter section speaks of attorney's fees
where there is a recovery in an action, but inasmuch as section
3861 includes a settlement without action, the words in section
3856, in referring to settlement after action, are not words
of limitation to that situation. If they are, the language in
section 3861 is rendered meaningless.
The effect of the majority holding is to make settlements
with the tort feasor an impossibility. The employee will not
want to settle, at least until after he has commenced an action,
because he will lose his attorney's fees. The employer will
not wish to settle for the same reason. I am assuming, and
it seems that the majority opinion holds, that the employer
may not deduct attorney's fees in case of a settlement by
''Assig-nc>d hy Chairman of Judicial Council.
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If settlements before action are to be completely diseither
around his
to get
un''""'"'s fees
first
action and then settling.
It is hard to believe the
intended such an absurd
situation to exist.
reasonable construction would allow
the deduction of
's fees
either employer or employee whether the settlement is made before or after the
commencement of an action against the tort feasor.
The majority seems to think that unfairness will result
where there is a settlement by either one or the other and
hence the rule favoring compromise is not applicable. This
is based on the premise, assumed by the majority, that either
the employer or employee may lawfully consummate a settlement without consent of the other. The statute provides
otherwise. (Lab. Code, §§ 3853, 3859, 3860.) The statute
was held inapplicable as between the employee and the tort
feasor ( Oilibrasi v. Reiter, 103 Cal.App.2d 397 [229 P.2d
394]) but of course it still applies as between the employer
and the employee. Here the employer is not objecting to
the settlement consummated by the employee with the tort
feasor. He, in effect, has approved the settlement as he is
seeking to benefit thereby. It is obvious that if the settlement
had been consummated without his consent, he would not
be bound by it and could sue the tort feasor to recover all
sums which he had expended on behalf of the employee for
compensation and medical and hospital treatment as a result
of the injury suffered by the employee for which the tort
feasor is liable. Vv e then have this anomalous situation. An
employee who has suffered an injury in the course of his
employment as the result of the negligence of a third party,
employs an attorney to handle his claim for damages against
such third party. The attorney is able to consummate a
settlement of the employee's claim which is satisfactory to
both the employee and the employer, but after the settlement
is consummated, the employer claims the entire amount of
the settlement and refuses to allow any compensation to the
attorney whose services were responsible for consummating
the settlement and obtaining the money which appears to
have been obtained solely for the benefit of the employer.
As pointed out above, if the employer had not consented
to the settlement, he would not be bound by it and could sue
the tort feasor for the amount of any claim he may have.
It seems to me that under any consideration of fairness and
justice, as well as a reasonable interpretation of the statutory

him.
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provisions applicable to such a situation, it requires that the
reasonable value of the services of the employee's attorney
in obtaining the settlement should be paid before the employer's claim is satisfied in whole or in part.
Assuming the majority opinion is correct in stating, "when
the third party's liability has been settled, either by the
employee or the employer, there is no provision for reimbursement to either of them for his legal expense,'' we then
have a situation in which the statutes do not cover the subject
of attorney's fees where there is a settlement, and, therefore,
we must turn to the " . . . well-established doctrine of equity
jurisprudence that where a common fund exists to which a
number of persons are entitled and in their interest successful
litigation is maintained for its preservation and protection,
an allowance of counsel fees may properly be made from such
fund. By this means all of the beneficiaries of the fund pay
their share of the expense necessary to make it available
to them. (14 Am.Jur., § 74, p. 47; Trustees of Int. Imp.
Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 [26 L.Ed. 1157] ; Estate
of Marre, 18 Cal.2d 191 [114 P.2d 591] ; see, also, notes 49
A.L.R.1149; 107 A.L.R. 749].)" (Winslow v. Harold G.
Ferguson Corp., 25 Cal.2d 274, 277 [153 P.2d 714} .) And
at page 283: "[The} long prevailing rule in equity . . .
allows such charge as a proper means of securing contribution
from those entitled to participate in the benefits of the litigation. And such counsel fees are customarily made senior
to other claims against the fund. (Scott v. Superio1· Court,
208 Cal. 303 [281 P. 55].) . . . Where a lawyer has rendered
such valuable service as to make available a fund for a class,
even though he appeared for only one claimant, it is equitable
that his compensation and expenses should come from the
entire fund saved for all classes concerned before it is distributed. (Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 161 [59
S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184].) Counsel's right to compensation
under such circumstances arises from the benefit conferred
upon those who would have suffered loss but for his timely
intervention, and not by reason of an agreement to pay his
fees . . . . As is stated in Estate of Marre, 18 Cal.2d 191,
192 [114 P.2d 591] : 'Plaintiffs who have succeeded in protecting, preserving or increasing a fund for the benefit of
themselves and others may be awarded compensation from
the fund for the services of their attorneys.' This principle
is derived from the equitable concept that where one of a
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group has borne the cost of litigation resulting in benefit to
the entire group, the latter should contribute to such expenses.
(Nolte v. Jhtdson Nav. Co., 47 F.2d 166; O'Hara v. Oakland County, 136 F.2d 152] .)
"Not only is it established that the litigant is entitled to
be compensated for the expense he has incurred in the prosecution of such an action, but there is created in favor of the
attorney who renders the service an equitable lien against
the fund so preserved. (Central Railroad & Bkg. Co. v.
Petttts, 113 U.S. 116 [5 S.Ct. 387, 28 L.Ed. 915]; Colley v.
Wolcott, 187 F. 595 [109 O.C.A. 425]; Muskegon Boiler
Works v. Tennessee Valley I. & R. Co., 274 F. 836.)
''These equitable considerations sustain appellant's position
as to the priority of his claim against the trust fund. . . .
Nor on equitable considerations should the claim of the federal
government for income taxes accrued before the commencement of this action stand on a distinguishable level in relation to appellant's allowance for counsel fees for preservation
of the fund. The latter, viewed as an expense of judicial
administration in making the trust assets available for distribution to claimants, should properly take priority." (Emphasis added; Winslow v. Harold G. Ferg7tson Corp., supra;
see, also, :Restatement, Restitution, § 105.)
I can see no reason why the rule announced in the authorities above cited should not be applicable to a situation such
as that presented in the case at bar. Certainly all of the
elements necessary to bring such rule into operation are
present here and I can see no reason why it should not be
invoked in the interests of justice.
For the foregoing reasons I would affirm the award.

